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Abstract. The paper deals with problems of safety and
security principles within wireless industrial
communication systems. First safety requirements to
wireless industrial communication system, summarisation
of attack methods and the available measures for risks
elimination are described with orientation to safety
critical applications. The mainly part is oriented to
identification of risks and summarisation of defensive
methods of wireless communication based on
cryptographic techniques. Practical part the
cryptoanalytic’s attacks to COTS (Commercial Off-The-
Shelf) wireless communications are mentioned based on
the IEEE 802.11 standards.
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1. Introduction
Industrial communication systems are important
elements of automation systems which are used in wide
variety of application, e. g. process manufacturing, electric
power generation and distribution, gas and water supply,
transportation and others.
In many cases the industrial communication systems
is component part of system which partook in control of
SRCP (Safety- Related Critical Processes). Undetected
corruption of data transmission (e.g. control commands)
can cause considerable substantially damages within
equipments, environments or demands on human health
and this is reason why system have to be designed so that
guarantee required SIL (Safety Integrity Level) defined by
generic standard IEC 61508 [1].
For this reason the safety-related wireless machines
must have implemented a number of safety  mechanisms
located into special safety or security profiles  distinct from
the office system, so called COTS (Commercial Off-The-
Shelf) systems [2]. Data integrity, user authentication and
access control are very important services need for the
safety critical operation of the industrial communication
system mainly if system is based on the wireless
technology.
In the last decade wireless technologies have been
used for several industrial application for remote control,
but for safety-related machine-to-machine applications are
still rare [3], [4].
In area of standard measurement and control systems
we can used many types of wireless technologies [5], [6].
Without GSM (Global System of Management) between
the most recommended standards belong technology Wi-
Fi, Bluetooth and ZigBee. Fig. 1 shows examples of some
wireless protocols, with comparison of their practical
distance and rate [7].
Fig. 1. Wireless protocols, their communication speed and
operation range.
When we compare wire fieldbus systems and wireless
communication systems many similar risks occur during
transmission are relevant also in wireless communication
systems, but wireless systems introduce also some new
risks and the probability of failures is often higher than in
wired systems.
Basic wireless communication threats we can
summarised by the following points:
· The transmission fades because the distance
between sender and receiver increases.
· The signal fades because of obstacles and of
environment conditions.
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· Transmission signals are reflected from surfaces
resulting in echoes and interference, or signal
appears because of reflections from long
distances.
· Two or more signals interfere with each other and
cause proper signal for another receiver.
· Receiver is too sensitive.
· The nodes understand the network state or
configuration differently at the same time.
· Security; intentional penetration to wireless
network.
· Systematic failure, characteristics of wireless
communication is not considered.
· Sleeping nodes in low power networks. Some
nodes can be ordered to sleep to lower power
consumption i.e. longer battery life.
These communication threats can effect the following
consequences: signal level is low, bit error rate increases,
data is corrupted or lost, the signal can be delayed, new
messages may be inserted. There is no communication
through a sleeping node until the node awakes and others.
Within communications between safety–related
wireless machine all the risks or threats must be
considered, safety requirements determined, adequate
measures are applied to minimise risks and the system is
validated, wireless communication can be relevant
possibility in safety-related machinery applications.
Basic principles valid for safety a security profiles
implemented within wireless communication system the
following safety a security standards define [8], [9], [10].
In  the  paper  safety  analysis  of  standard  Wi-Fi
communication protocols based on IEEE 802.11 standard
is mentioned only with orientation to cryptography
mechanisms used in cryptography protocols WEP and
WPA.
2. Analyses of Cryptography
Mechanisms used in Cryptography
Wireless Communication Protocols
The basic requirements for all cryptosystem are so
that cryptography mechanisms implemented within
communication protocols were resistant against known
cryptoanalytic attacks during all life time of system. For
considering of safety and effectively of used cryptography
algorithm can be used the method for expression of
computationally complexity of algorithms, which are
based on the principle of complexity theory. Operational
demanding of algorithm is determined on the based on the
asymptotic complexity, which is describes which way the
behaviour of algorithm will be change according to input
data of length n. Operational demanding is generally
marked by notation O (called Landauov’s notation or
Bachmann-Landauov’s notation) and is function f of input
data O(f(n)). Computationally complexity determine
generally three parameters:  S (Space),  T  (Time)  and   D
(Data).
Nowadays as computationally safety algorithms are
considered algorithms with exponential combinational
complexity, which can be breakup in real time for small
value of n input data only.
Basic specifications of communication Wi-Fi protocol
defined according to standard IEEE 802.11 [11].
Nowadays series IEEE 802.11a to IEEE 802.11n exist.
Original cryptography standard IEEE 802.11 is based on
the  WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) protocol, which has
implemented the stream Rivest Cipher RC4 (for data
confidentiality) and check sum on the base of CRC (Cyclic
Redundancy Check) CRC-32 (for data integrity).  Standard
length  of  the  key  is  40  bits,  to  which  is  added  24  bits  of
initial vector (IV). The key is represented by the
hexadecimal number. Expanded length of the key in WEP
protocol  is  104  bits  with  24  bits  of  IV.  Less  safe  kind  of
ciphering, which supported WEP protocol is in the present
time replaced by cryptography protocol WPA (Wi-Fi
Protected Access), which uses stream cipher RC4 too, but
the length of cipher key is 128 bits and the length of initial
vector is 48 bits. Fundamental increasing of safety is
obtained with using TKIP (Temporary Key Integrity
Protocol), what is protocol for dynamic change of keys.
The use of this type of protocol is based on the server
RADIUS, this solution is way for assuring of company.
For private sector simpler implementation exists via PSK
(Pre-Shared Key), in which the keys in all equipment are
set forwards. Protocol WPA MIC (Message Integrity Code)
has implemented (for integrity check) so called
MICHAEL. This method uses the check of the frames
counter, what eliminates against replaying attacks.
Nowadays in recommendation IEEE 802.11i advanced
cryptography protocol WPA2 is defined, which replaced
protocols WEP and WPA.
Tab. 1. The main characteristics of the cryptography protocols
used in the wireless networks.
Protocol WEP WPA WPA2
Encryption Rivest Cipher 4
RC4
Rivest Cipher 4
RC4
Advanced Encryption Standard AES
Key length 104 bits40 bits
128 bits (encryption)
64 bits
(authentication)
128 bits
192 bits
256 bits
Length of IV 24 bits 48 bits 48 bits
Data integrity CRC-32 Michael
Counter with CBC-MAC (Cipher
Block Chaining of Message
Authentication Code)
Header
integrity None Michael
Counter with CBC-MAC (Cipher
Block Chaining of Message
Authentication Code)
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Key control None
Extensible
Authentication
Protocol
(EAP)
Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)
In this protocol the stream cipher RC4 is replaced by
cipher AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) [12], which
is in the present time computationally safety cryptography
standard, which symmetric cipher DES (Data Encryption
Standard) replaced. Assuring by protocol WPA2 contents
authentication according to IEEE 802.1x and definition of
new  protocol    CCMP  (Counter Mode Cipher Block
Chaining MIC Protocol).The main characteristics of the
cryptography protocols used in wireless networks are
illustrated in Tab. 1.
3. Practical Realisations of Attacks
WEP protocol is based on the RC4 encryption
algorithm, with the secret key of 40 bits or 104 bits being
combined with a 24 bits of IV (Initialisation Vector). The
encryption of message C is determined using the following
formula:
( )[ ] ( )[ ] IVKRCM ICVMC 4+= ,            (1)
where || is a concatenation operator, ICV is integrity check
value and + is a XOR operator. Clearly, the initialisation
vector is the key to WEP security, so to maintain a decent
level of security and minimise disclosure the IV should be
incremented for each packet so that subsequent packets are
encrypted with the different keys. Unfortunately for WEP
security, the IV is transmitted in plain text and the IEEE
802.11 standard does not mandate IV incrementation,
leaving this security measure at the option of particular
wireless terminal (access point or wireless card)
implementations.
Security weaknesses of WEP can be summarised as
follows:
· the weaknesses of RC4 algorithm due to key
construction,
· the use of static key (maximum of 4 keys), change
only IV,
· IVs are too short (24 bits) and IV reuse is allowed
(no protection against message replay, cycle only
224), ICV encryption with data,
· the use the same algorithm for encryption and
authentication,
· no proper integrity check (CRC32 is used for
error detection and isn’t cryptographically secure
due to its linearity),
· no built-in method of updating keys.
These weaknesses are used within the active and the
passive attacks against WEP protocol. The main attracts
are the following: brute-force attack (distributed and
dictionary attacks), FMS attack, KoreK, Klein’s attack,
Man-in-the-middle attack and others.
The attacks can be realised via different SW tools as
AirCrack, Airbase, AirSnort, Chopchop, Sorwep,
WepAttack, WEPcrack, WepLab and others, which are
generally supported by Linux. In the paper FMS attack is
descript in detail.
FMS attack (the name according to authors Scott
Fluhrer, Itsik Mantin, Adi Shamir) is based on the three
basic principles:
1. Some IVs form the cipher RC4 in the manner in
which information about the key in input bytes
can be disclosed.
2. The weak invariant allows the use the output bits
for choosing the most probably bits of key.
3. The first output bits of key we can discover
always, because they include the head - line of
SNAP (SubNetwork Access Protocol).
On the base of catching the couple (weak IV, the first
byte of RC4 stream) is able to determinate the secret key.
In the paper the application Aircrack-ng was used
for implementation of FMS attacks.  AirCrack is WEP and
WPA-PSK cracker, which is based on the passwords attack
after summarisation of the sufficient number of packets.
The application Aircrack contains three main
utilities, used in the three attack phases required to recover
the key:
· airodump: wireless sniffing tool used to discover
WEP-enabled networks,
· aireplay: injection tool to increase traffic,
· aircrack: WEP key cracker making use of
collected unique IVs.
4. Results of Safety Analyses
For testing purpose the network which is illustrated
in the Fig. 2 was realised.
Fig. 2. Realised wireless network.
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The testing was realised in the monitoring mode of
attacker wireless card. The attack can be specified as
passive attack, because it is no able to observe on the
authorised network operation side.  The attack was
realised in the following steps:
1. Initialization of wireless network interface card to
monitor mode by tool Airmon-ng:
root@bt:~# airmon-ng start wlan0
2. Find all the wireless networks via application
Airodump-ng from package of programme
Aircrack-ng (see the Fig. 3):
root@bt:~# airodump-ng mon0
Fig. 3. The results of the network scan via application Airodump-ng.
3. Determining the network for breaking of WEP
password. Wireless network iWLAN was created
for this test (the name of tested network was
iWLAN):
root@bt:~# airodump-ng -w wep -c 11 --bssid
00:02:72:64:7B:74 mon0
Testing was realised for two examples:
· The use of 64-bits WEP security with 40-bits
secret key (see the Fig. 4)
· The use of 128-bit WEP security with 104-bits
secret key (see the Fig. 5)
Fig. 4. Scan of wireless network iWLAN with 64-bits key.
Fig. 5. Scan of wireless network iWLAN with 128-bits key.
4. The increase of network traffic in network
iWLAN by using tool Aireplay-ng:
root@bt:~# aireplay-ng -1 0 -a
00:02:72:64:7B:74 mon0
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root@bt:~# aireplay-ng -3 -b
00:02:72:64:7B:74 mon0
5. To break WEP password is possible after catching
of sufficient number of frames with different IV
only (via application Aircrack-ng):
root@bt:~# aircrack-ng wep-01.cap
Within realisation of FMS attack about hundred
frames with weak initialisation vector (IV) was catching.
In network with low traffic we can accelerate this by using
active reinjection frames or fragmentation attack.
For successful breaking of 64-bits WEP password
(password kris5) 21212 frames was catching. In this
reason was decryption realised with successful 100 %. The
list from application Aircrack-ng is illustrated in Fig. 6.
Fig. 6. The successful breaking of 64-bits WEP password via application Aircrack-ng.
The practice of breaking 128-bits WEP password was
the similar. In the first the number of catching frames was
25000 and the experiment was unsuccessful. The
experiment was repeated and the successfully breaking of
WEP password was realised with 42335 frames (password
unizafelkris5). Decryption was realised with successful 100
%. The list from application Aircrack-ng is illustrated in
Fig. 7.
Fig. 7. The successful breaking of 128-bits WEP password via application Aircrack-ng.
5. Conclusion
Resulting from realized cryptanalytic attacks to
standard wireless communication we can establish that
this system without implementation of additional safety
layer does not fulfill the requirements to safety-related
communications with increasing value of safety integrity
level  (SIL  1  –  4).  In  this  system  it  is  necessary  to
implement the safety mechanisms according to norms
relevant for open transmission systems and validate
additional safety layer of wireless machine in
consideration in required SIL using method illustrated e.
g. in [7]. The other solution is Zigbee communication
standard [13] using on the base of AES cryptographic
standard.
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